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Technology roadmaps are increasingly usedby governments to informand promote technological
transitions, such as a transition to a hydrogen energy system. This paper develops a framework for
understanding how current roadmapping practice relates to emerging theories of the governance
of systems innovation. In applying this framework to a case study of hydrogen roadmaps, the
paper finds that roadmapping for transitions needs to place greater emphasis on ensuring good
quality and transparent analytic and participatory procedures. To be most useful, roadmaps
should be embedded within institutional structures that enable the incorporation of learning
and re-evaluation, but in practice most transition roadmaps are one-off exercises.
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1. Introduction: roadmaps, transitions and hydrogen
Technology roadmaps have become ubiquitous in discussions of long term energy technology policy. Indeed, technology road-
mapping has found a place at the heart of global policy efforts for a low-carbon future: In 2008, the G8 andMajor Economies declared
“Wealso note the value of technology roadmaps as tools to promote continuous investment and cooperation in clean energy research,
development, demonstration, and deployment.” [1].
Increasingly, technology roadmaps are developed for major socio-technical systems changes, or technological transitions. This
paper examines the role of technology roadmaps as instruments in the governance of such long-term transitions. To do this, it
draws on a large literature on socio-technical change that has developed over recent years, but that has done so largely independently
of the literature on roadmapping. This paper seeks to bring together these separate but related strands of research, andmake recom-
mendations for the practice of roadmapping in transition policy.
To illustrate and inform the theoretical discussion, the paper draws on a case study of hydrogen roadmaps. Hydrogen energy –
a long-term and highly uncertain option for enabling deep decarbonisation of the energy system – has been a particular focus for
government-directed roadmapping activities. This paper draws on a review of hydrogen roadmaps to present a critical analysis of
the use of technology roadmapping as part of the ‘toolbox’ of policy-makers tasked with steering society towards a low-carbon
future.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces technology roadmapping, and describes the way in which roadmaps
have been adopted by policymakers seeking to facilitate transitions towards alternative, more sustainable, technological systems.
Section 2 draws on insights from socio-technical theory to illustrate how roadmaps can be used as tools in governance of transi-
tions, and uses this literature to develop a framework for evaluating roadmaps in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the case study,
hydrogen energy. Section 5 evaluates hydrogen energy roadmaps against the framework developed in Section 3, and Section 6
draws conclusions.
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2. Technology roadmapping
2.1. Technology roadmapping: origins and use in industry
Technology roadmapping as a technique was brought to prominence in the academic literature by Galvin [2], in an editorial in
Science that highlighted the successful use of roadmapping at Motorola and in the semi-conductor industry. Since then, a large
literature has developed dealing with technology roadmapping in industry and within firms [3–7]. The approach has become
widespread, and can be seen as part of the ongoing trend for technology futures to be more actively organized and managed
both by private and public organisations [8].
Technology roadmaps allow technology developments to be integrated with business planning, and they allow assessment of the
impacts of new technologies andmarket developments on the prospects for a firm [5]. Roadmaps are developed in a number of ways,
and various scholars have produced outlines of the key stages of developing technology roadmaps (for excellent overviews, see [4,5]).
From this variety of approaches, a set of core practices can be identified:
• Roadmaps identify the major players in the innovation system, and provide an outline of the industry or emerging innovation
network.
• They describe the current status of a technology.
• They set out a view of the future of a technology, including the possibilities for its development and deployment.
• They identify needs and priorities—including R&D needs, and sometimes market and regulatory needs, such as codes and
standards.
• Those produced at the sectoral level (rather than by individual firms) aim to offer a consensus view of the way forward. As a
result, they are almost always collaborative, or at least consultative, in the sense that they include the views of different
teams, groups and stakeholders.
• They are frequently – but not always – depicted graphically [9].
• Many roadmaps – but by no means all – involve regular updates and monitoring of progress against milestones and targets. The
roadmapdevelopedby the semi-conductor industry is re-issued every 2 years,with ‘updates’ issued in the interim. It, and roadmaps
like it, is continually redrawn to reflect new knowledge and developments.
Roadmaps should not be understood as projections or forecasts. Rather, roadmaps conflate and combine three different ways of
understanding the future: expectations (what is thought likely to happen), desires (what is hoped will happen) and promises
(whatwill bemade to happen). In combining and conflating these perspectives, roadmapsweave a picture of the future that attempts
to galvanise actions in the present. In doing so, roadmapping processes often drawon other foresight approaches, including scenarios,
Delphi surveys, and quantitative forecasts. In effect, we can understand roadmaps in the following ways:
– As the current ‘state of the debate’. A roadmap embodies a view of the status of a technology in terms of its development, and
an inventory of possibilities, barriers and opportunities. This is usually presented as a consensus view, at least of those who
have participated in the process.
– As an attempt to create a realistic and pragmatic projection ofwhat is both feasible and desirable. Roadmaps are informed by analysis,
and aim to set out a plausible view ofwhat the future could hold. A successful roadmapmust be seen as at least credible or plausible,
even if they are not always seen as setting out a likely or inevitable future.
– As a guide to innovators. A roadmap maps the key areas in which progress is required (what Hughes [10] memorably described
as ‘reverse salients’), including the barriers and the opportunities, allowing scientists and engineers to get a clearer sense of
where resources need to be focused to move the innovation system forwards.
– As a ‘bid’ for a particular future in a competitive market in which only some futures will attract resources and support. Roadmaps
articulate a particular view of what the future can and should be like – i.e. they set out a normative vision of the future – and they
demand resources and support accordingly [11]. As a result, we should expect roadmaps to be optimistic, and sometimes even
hyperbolic.
– As a promise of what will be done, and how the future will unfold.
– As a process that facilitates the development of networks and the alignment of actors within an innovation system.
– As a tool in the ongoing management of innovation. Many roadmaps are periodically updated, and provide an institutional
structure through which actors in the innovation system can monitor progress, consider changing priorities and identify
opportunities.
2.2. Roadmapping in public policy: from products to systems
Technology roadmappingwas first applied at the level of individual products and technologies. Over time, the scope of roadmaps has
expanded to encompass product or technology groups, and whole industry sectors [12]. As the scope of roadmapping has expanded,
governments have become more involved in using roadmaps in public policy. Early examples of governments supporting technology
roadmap initiatives emerged from industry and trade departments, keen to foster the competitiveness of their industries [13,14]. In
these exercises, the role of government was limited to providing support for the roadmapping process, and government was not nec-
essarily interested in the direction taken by the technological developments discussed. The interest of government in promoting
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roadmaps was to facilitate the development of competitive industries, and to push science and technology forward, wherever forward
might be.
More recently, roadmaps have become a tool by which governments foster not only the development of competitive industries,
but also the development of new and emerging technological systems that meet social goals, such as low-carbon technologies. Road-
maps are developed as part of the process of setting directions for the socio-technical development of society. The last decade in par-
ticular has seen increasing use of roadmapping approaches in technology policy by governments, particularly in the context of energy
policy and the transition to a low-carbon energy system [15].
In making this shift from industry to public policy, the nature of technology roadmapping activities has adapted to include a
broader set of concerns. Technology roadmapping in industry tends to focus on relatively short term and quite technical devel-
opments (see, for example, the roadmaps produced by the semi-conductor industry [16], which are often cited as an archetype
of successful roadmapping). In contrast, governments and policy advocates have tended to use the tools, approaches and lan-
guage of technology roadmapping to address issues that are considerably longer-term in nature [15], and that involve substantial
social and political as well as technical elements.
This broadening of the scope of roadmapping activities echoes a shift in technology policy for the environment, from the promotion
of individual ‘environmental’ technologies (such as end-of-pipe scrubbers), to the transformation of entire socio-technical systems
[17,18]. Roadmaps, once used to map out the development path for new products, are now developed to articulate pathways for
long-term sustainable “systems innovations” or “technological transitions” (these terms are used as described by e.g. [19,20]). In
other words, they are used to articulate a vision of the development of an entire system, including the infrastructural, market, policy,
educational and regulatory developments as well as technological issues.
The potential development of a ‘hydrogen economy’ is one such example—the development of a hydrogen energy system requires
substantial shifts in institutions, physical infrastructure, user behaviour, supply chains, industry structure and so on. It is not simply
the development of a set of new technologies, but rather it is a socio-technical transition [21]. Roadmaps for a hydrogen economy en-
compass a much broader array of concerns than is typical in technology roadmaps in industry.
In short, technology policy makers and advocates interested in the governance of technological transitions have adopted an
analytical and management tool that was developed for use within industry (technology roadmapping), and transferred it into
a new context (socio-technical transitions). Governments are using roadmapping as one of a number of tools (along with fiscal
structures, technology funds, trading schemes and traditional regulations) for managing – or attempting to manage – long
term transitions in the socio-technical arrangements of society.
This shift raises questions about the way in which the tools of technology roadmapping can be applied to these broader, more
systemic shifts in socio-technical arrangements.
3. Technology roadmaps as instruments of transition policy
Policy-makers are already using roadmaps as part of the policy architecture through which they attempt to steer transitions
towards more sustainable socio-technical arrangements. However, the practice and literature on roadmapping, and the literature
on the governance of transitions, have developed largely separately. In this section, the paper seeks position ‘transition roadmaps’
within the broader theoretical literature on the governance of transitions.
3.1. Governing transitions: insights from socio-technical theory and transition management
Within the socio-technical literature, technologies are understood to be embedded within broad configurations – ‘seamless
webs’ – of social and technical arrangements [10,20,22]. These arrangements include patterns of behaviour, social norms, regula-
tory rules, and so on. These structures in which technologies are embedded are termed a socio-technical ‘regime’, or ‘technology-
specific innovation system’ [23]. Regimes are dynamically stable and resist change, resulting in inertia and what is often called
‘lock-in’ [24,25].
Change in such systems can be best understood through an evolutionary perspective [20,26]. Emerging technologies are de-
veloped and nurtured in niches, by ‘proto’ innovation systems. In the early stages of development, the actors involved in the
emerging innovation system are less closely aligned than those in mature systems. To develop, networks of actors must align
and coordinate action, and fulfil a series of key activities or ‘functions’ of a successful innovation system, including: development
of knowledge, entrepreneurship, mobilization of resources, legitimation, guidance of the search, and diffusion of knowledge
through networks [27,28].
This model of technological change as a quasi-evolutionary process, in which action is constrained by regimes, provides an ex-
planation for the frequently observed failure of technology policies that are based on classic market failure approaches [27,29].
The economics of innovation (see, e.g. [30]), on which such policies are based, can be seen as only a partial account of the dynam-
ics of innovation, because it does not take into account the ‘embeddedness’ of technologies within complex social structures that
constrain action.
Advocates of market-based approaches to innovation policy frequently contrast market-based policies with the perceived alterna-
tive: top-downplanning and control, characterised by a strong role for the state in attempting to ‘pick technologicalwinners’ [31]. Quite
rightly, attempts to plan technological progress are seen with considerable scepticism: we do not and cannot knowwhich frontiers of
scientific and technical advance will lead to themost rapid progress. Technological developments are inherently unpredictable and in-
determinate. Furthermore, given the nature of innovation systems as networks of actors, practices and institutions, it is clear that no-
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one actor is ‘in charge’ to do the top-down planning [32]. The power required to steer the socio-technical development is diffused
through networks of actors, rather than held by the state or by any one actor. As a result, attempts to ‘plan’ a successful transition
are likely to fail [33], as are attempts to re-make socio-technical arrangements entirely through price signals.
How, then, can governments guide the emergence of more sustainable socio-technical systems? Various approaches have been
suggested that emphasise a ‘reflexive’ and adaptive approach, focusing on learning, reappraisal and experimentation. These echo
adaptive management approaches adopted in natural resource management [34,35], and include transition management [36,37],
strategic niche management [38], and time strategies [39,40]. The literature on network governance is also useful here, describing
governance strategieswhen power is diffused through actors in heterogeneous networks [41], of which emerging innovation systems
are an example.
Of greatest relevance to our understanding of roadmaps as governance tools for transitions is the attention that the socio-
technical literature in general, and transition management in particular, has placed on the role of expectations and futures in
guiding socio-technical change. In order to more fully clarify how this relates to roadmaps, the paper now turns to a specific
area of the socio-technical literature, that deals with technological expectations.
3.2. Technology futures in innovation policy: governance of and by expectations
A growing literature on the sociology of technological expectations has emphasised that expectations and social visions play
an active role in shaping innovative activities and influencing the technological developments that ultimately occur [42–45].
Scholars in this field describe technological expectations as ‘performative’, meaning that expectations play a role in shaping the
way in which technologies develop.
Expectations lead actors within an innovation system to focus their activities, investment and resources on options that are
thought most likely to succeed, with the result that these options become increasingly likely to succeed as further resources
are focused on them. Furthermore, expectations are important in the process of aligning actors around common goals. Shared ex-
pectations help to establish a common agenda, thus strengthening innovation networks. As a result, expectations can – to some
extent – be self-fulfilling [43]. When expectations becomewidely shared, they shape even the actions of those who do not share in
the widely held beliefs, since such sceptics know that most others in the innovation system will act on the basis of these shared
expectations [46]. Simply put, it is easier to operate within the innovation system when you appear to be in agreement with what
everyone else agrees is ‘the way things are going’. Shared expectations thus become part of the ‘rule set’ that constrains and en-
ables particular kinds of activities within the innovation system. Within an evolutionary perspective on technological change, ex-
pectations can be understood as important factors in both the generation of variation and in the selection environment [47].
Technological expectations thus help to promote several core functions of an emerging technological innovation system out-
lined earlier: the mobilization of resources, the development of legitimacy, networking, and establishing clear guidance of the
search1 [27,28,48]. Expectations are also critical in the establishment of niches, or ‘protected spaces’, in which new technologies
can develop [38,49].
The fact that expectations help to shape the direction of innovative activitymeans that technology futures – scenarios and visions
of the future – become a contested space in which various actors compete to establish dominance of expectations that match their
interests [11,42]. Thus hydrogen enthusiasts envisage, anticipate and promote a hydrogen future; while many deep green environ-
mentalists predict and describe futures in which social and cultural changes, rather than new technologies, reduce the pressures hu-
mankind exerts on our natural environment. This offers an opportunity for governments to attempt to engineer the ‘expectations
landscape’, and hence influence the direction of socio-technical development. Konrad [50] has succinctly summed up this approach
by speaking of ‘governance of and by expectations’.
Several strands of research have built on the idea that futures can be performative, and have articulated approaches to the use
of expectations and futures in the governance of transitions (e.g. [51–53]). Vergragt and others [53–55] have focused on the pro-
cess of vision articulation and participatory backcasting as a means to foster learning about what is possible in terms of systems
innovation, and to build the emerging innovation networks through alignment around a common vision. Their work focuses on
the importance of activities within radical niches, arguing that environmental imperatives such as climate change require transi-
tions to systems with radically improved sustainability performance, and that following business-as-usual assumptions and tra-
jectories is insufficient. Participatory backcasting processes are advocated as providing people with a space to rethink cultural
practices, and (ideally) to experiment with these in the context of ‘bounded socio-technical experiments’ [56].
Sondeijker et al. [51] have also focused on the role of visions and futures in transition management, advocating the use of
‘transition scenarios’. These are seen as serving many of the same functions as technology roadmaps. “Scenarios provide long-
term images of sustainable futures on a strategical level. In this sense, they serve as a framework for short-term actions at an op-
erational level. They ensure the enrolment of actors into coalitions for change and strategic conversation within and between
these coalitions. This is supposed to result in alignment and mobilization of collective action necessary to initiate and maintain
sustainable system innovations.” [51] pp. 20.
There has been little cross-over between ‘transition scenarios’ theory and those working with technology roadmaps, but the
similarities are clear. Indeed, as de Laat has noted, the practice of technology roadmapping has in many ways adopted – perhaps
unconsciously – some of the messages from socio-technical theory [57]. In particular, the idea that technical expectations and
1 Following Hekkert et al. [28], “guidance of the search refers to those activities within the innovation system that can positively affect the visibility and clarity
of speciﬁc wants among technology users”.
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visions have a performative role, and that they therefore can be ‘deployed’ as a strategic action in their own right, is clearly em-
bodied in the practice of roadmapping.
Roadmaps, alongside transition scenarios and participatory backcasting, can thus be seen as ‘purposefully performative’ futures
exercises, in which the explicit aim of the process is not just to inform decision making, but to actively shape the behaviour of actors
in the innovation system through the development and deployment of a view of the future. This is in contrast tomany other foresight
approaches, such as exploratory scenarios or Delphi surveys, and suggests that a different set of issues are relevant for evaluating
roadmapping processes.
3.3. The roadmapper's dilemma: between opening up and closing down
The use of futures as toolswithwhich to shape transition paths is notwithout its critics. In particular, the role of a consensus guiding
vision in transitionshas beenquestioned onboth normative and practical grounds [58]. These critiques are of direct relevance to the use
of roadmapping in informing and enacting transitions policy.
At the heart of these critiques lie questions about the extent to which it is desirable and useful to attempt to articulate and
champion a single coherent view of the future, which ‘closes down’ the relevant set of perspectives and discourses, as opposed
to processes that focus on ‘opening up’ the articulation of alternative possible futures to encompass a pluralist perspective and
more diverse pathways [59].
Of particular concern are issues of politics, power and democratic accountability: if expectations can be deployed as tools with
which to shape the direction of socio-technical change, the question of who is involved in informing the development of prospec-
tive transition paths becomes central. Shove and Walker have noted that “…[D]espite extensive debate and rhetoric about the
construction and democratic choice of visions and images of the future, the depth of the politics involved is frequently under-
played.” [60].p. 766. And while several authors writing on roadmaps have argued for the establishment of consensus pathways,
it is important to recognise that achieving consensus often entails the exclusion of minority perspectives [61].
Researchers developing transition scenarios and participatory backcasting have acknowledged these difficulties. Indeed, some
authors have suggested that the unique value of constructing normative technological visions and roadmaps is neither that they
provide a clear set of ‘signposts’, nor their role in aligning actors and expectations – though these are both acknowledged to be
important – but rather that they provide a space for debate and deliberation about technological options and the preferences,
values and perspectives of different social groups [21,62,63]. In this view, the articulation of visions and pathways is part of
what Stirling calls ‘precautionary foresight’ [64]—it is a means to open up appraisal of options to wider views, perspectives and
framings, rather than a means to develop a consensus plan.
Second, and quite separately from concerns about accountability, the articulation of a single and exclusive transition path ap-
pears to ignore the inescapable truth that the future is neither wholly predictable nor wholly malleable. While shared expecta-
tions clearly play a role in determining the path of socio-technical development, it is obviously not possible to simply talk
ourselves into a sustainable future [65]. In the face of such fundamental uncertainty, attempts to choose and pursue a single tran-
sition path are unlikely to be fruitful. Again, researchers involved in participatory backcasting and transition scenarios emphasise
the multiple and contingent routes towards a ‘guiding visions’. In doing so, they attempt to develop transition pathways that are
more robust in the face of uncertainties, and that enable the inclusion of diverse and plural perspectives. Yet experience suggests
that actors in the innovation system are unwilling to subscribe to overly diverse, pluralist and contested pathways. The language of in-
clusivity, diversity and ‘opening up’ does not breed the kind of confidence and shared sense of purpose on specific investments, projects
and technologies that are required for aligning the innovation network.
Roadmaps must articulate a shared view of where things are going – a coherent and reasonably concrete shared direction of
search – if they are to provide a basis for action. The roadmapper is thus trapped between two possibilities. On the one hand, a
confident, prescriptive roadmap developed on the basis of a consensus of a subset of relevant (and powerful) actors will have
most influence. Yet on the other hand, this is likely to reflect incumbent interests—who are often precisely those interests tied
up with a less-sustainable socio-technical system and, by focusing on a narrow view of what can and will be done, it can downplay
uncertainties and alternative pathways.
The following section develops a set of criteria to address how roadmapping for system innovations can balance these
objectives.
4. Criteria for evaluating roadmaps for systems innovation
In this section, I draw on the preceding theoretical discussion to develop a framework through which ‘transition roadmaps’
may be developed and evaluated. The framework articulates the key attributes that must be addressed if a roadmap is to provide
a useful component of transition policy. It is based on a process evaluation, in which the process used to develop the roadmap is
assessed, as opposed to an outcome evaluation, since the latter would be impractical given the severe difficulties of attribution in
a context as complex as an innovation system [66]. The framework is derived from the preceding theoretical discussion. In par-
ticular, the framework aims to assess the extent to which roadmaps are successful at balancing the need to ‘close down’ the di-
rection to a single, prescriptive view, while remaining responsive and sensitive to the normative and practical critiques set out
above.
Given the special character of roadmaps as ‘purposefully performative’ futures, the evaluation framework differs somewhat
from others found in the foresight evaluation literature (e.g. [66]). Despite these differences, there are also clear parallels with
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the foresight evaluation framework developed by Georghiou and Keenan [66], for example in assessing the quality and type of
analysis underpinning the exercise, and in gauging the appropriateness of the roadmapping process.
4.1. Credibility: is the future pathway plausible?
Roadmaps must articulate a view of the future that is credible and persuasive. Without being seen as a plausible view of the
future, roadmaps lose their power to direct and shape the behaviour of actors involved in the innovation system.
This has a number of implications for how roadmapping is carried out:
• First, it demands that any analysis on which the roadmap is constructed is sound, and based on reasonable assumptions and
methods.
• Second, it requires that the relevant expertise has taken part in shaping the analysis and the roadmap. In the context of a system
innovation, such as hydrogen, this implies that a broad range of expertise must be involved, suggesting some form of participatory
or consultative exercise with a broad range of expert stakeholders.
• Third, credibility demands that the actors with greatest ability to influence achievement of the envisaged futures are involved, and
are – at least to some extent – committed to that future. The roadmapping processmust secure the commitment of key actors to the
process, and must communicate that these key actors believe in the roadmap.
• Finally, credibility requires that the roadmap engages adequately with the social, political, market and cultural aspects of the
envisaged transition, as well as the ‘purely’ technological elements. A roadmap that fails to set out a plausible view of market
and social contexts, but envisages profound technological systems change, will be less credible than one that embeds a vision
of technological change within a broader context of anticipated market and socio-political evolution.
4.2. Desirability: is the future pathway defensible as a good choice for society?
Those developing roadmaps within a public policy context have a responsibility to articulate a future pathway that is desirable
from a societal perspective. This begs the question of who gets to decide what kind of future is in the interests of society, and on
what basis such decisions are made.
Clearly, the desirability of the envisaged future can be based on goals and directions established through existing democratic in-
stitutions. For example, analysis might show that hydrogen technologies can enable emissions reductions to meet legislated carbon
targets. However, guidance from legislatures typically provides insufficient clarity inmaking choices about which technological path-
ways to pursue.
Those developing transition roadmaps must make choices about how to determine a desirable direction for socio-technical devel-
opment. The roadmapping literature emphasises the desirability of establishing consensus amongst the stakeholders involved [3,67].
Yet in a pluralist democratic society, it is not always straightforward – or even necessarily possible – to establish a clear consensus
view of the desirability of a given future pathway [68,69]. To overcome this challenge, the framework in this paper adopts a deliberative
democratic perspective, which demands that public policy decisions are accountable, in the very literal sense that a clear ‘account’ is
given ofwhy a decisionwasmade in thatway [68]. Rather than demand that roadmaps set out a future forwhich there is a broad social
consensus, evaluation of the roadmap should instead focus on the degree to which roadmaps can justify the choices made in deliber-
ative terms. In other words, roadmaps should be explicit and transparent in their aims, the process used, and who took part.
Finally roadmaps that are developed through processes that are broadly inclusive and participatory will have a greater claim to
setting out a legitimately desirable future pathway. Work on network governance (an appropriate theoretical frame for innova-
tion system governance) has emphasised the importance of inclusivity [70]; and, as discussed, many theorists of technology argue
persuasively that broad participation is important in both appraising and committing to particular technological futures [71]. This
is not to say that participation is a clear route to democratic legitimacy, but rather that roadmapping processes that exclude op-
portunities for participation are less able to claim legitimacy.
4.3. Utility: does the roadmap help advance the innovation system?
The third criterion relates to utility: does the roadmap and roadmapping process facilitate the further development of the in-
novation system? In other words, does it help the innovation system to perform core functions of innovation systems, as de-
scribed by Bergek et al. [27]?
Where roadmaps meet criteria 1 (credibility) and 2 (desirability), they automatically help foster legitimacy for the technology
in question, which is a core function of a successful innovation system. Beyond this, to be useful the roadmap must provide a co-
herent direction of search for scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs and other innovation system actors. A shared research agenda
enables alignment of enactors and selectors, and a roadmap is one of the ways in which this function can be facilitated. Any road-
map provides the broad direction of search, in the sense that it articulates a place for the technology in theworld. Beyond this, a road-
map should identify specific research needs and priorities, highlighting what Hughes referred to as ‘reverse salients’ [10]. Depending
on the degree of maturity of the innovation system, this may involve setting detailed, technically-defined ‘targets’. Alternatively, it
may only highlight areas that are of particular concern.
Roadmaps must navigate a careful balance between setting out a confident view of a plausible and desirable future, and over-
promising and ‘hype’, which can damage the prospects of the innovation system [72].
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Finally, the roadmapping processmust be appropriate for the stage of the innovation system [66]. For innovation systems in an early,
formative stage, for example, setting very long-term technical targets may not be helpful if the capacity to work towardsmeeting them
does not exist. In such a situation, a roadmap that sets out a broad framing vision of the path forward is likely to be more useful.
4.4. Adaptability: is the roadmap process consistent with reﬂexive, adaptive management?
The literature on transition management emphasises the need for continual adjustment and re-evaluation of policies and pro-
grammes, and the literature on roadmaps in industry has emphasised that roadmaps are more effective where they are developed
as an ongoing process rather than a one-off document (e.g. [5]). As Propp and Rip [73] have argued “Roadmaps need to bemaintained
and updated to become effective. Where an actor to fulfil that function exists… roadmaps become a powerful tool for creating align-
ment around technological and product options and to help accelerating their development” (p. 11). This argues for roadmaps to be
developed andmaintained within an institutional context – such as a partnership between government and industry groups – that is
able to learn, and to produce updates to the roadmap as time goes by.
Ideally, the actor(s) responsible for producing andmaintaining the roadmapwill do so in a reflexivemanner, one that emphasises
learning and evaluation, and is open to reflection on the role and value of the roadmapping process and its framing. In the context of
transitionmanagement, Shove andWalker [60] highlight that the question of ‘what is to be transitioned’ is frequently not amatter for
debate. In the same way, roadmapping lacks obvious mechanisms through which to adequately justify how transition questions are
framed and determined. As with the substance of the roadmap itself, the institutional structures through which roadmaps are iden-
tified and framed should be transparent, and able to reflect critically on the framing of the exercise overall. In effect, this requires that
roadmapping processes sponsored by government should be conductedwithin a broader context of technology foresight and strategy
governance processes.
4.5. Summary: evaluation criteria for transition roadmaps
Table 1 summarises the criteria, and highlights the key questions addressed by each criterion.
5. The case of hydrogen
Hydrogen, like electricity, is an energy carrier that can be produced and used in a variety of different ways. Like electricity, the en-
vironmental attributes of hydrogen depend largely on how it is produced and used, since it is not a significant pollutant in itself [74].
While there has been a decline in excitement in policy circles about hydrogen since around 2005 [72,75], it remains an important op-
tion for deep decarbonisation of the transport sector and for diversification of energy sources for transport, and potentially as a wide-
spread carrier of energy for heat and power demands.
Hydrogen has been a vibrant arena for the development of roadmaps [67,76]. National and regional governments, US States
(e.g. Ohio, California, Connecticut, New York, Florida, Indiana, Minnesota and others), and a number of cities across the globe
have undertaken roadmapping activities concerning hydrogen, alongside numerous firms and industry associations.
A sample of hydrogen roadmaps produced in the last 10 years was reviewed, with a focus on those produced as part of policy
processes by national governments (or supra-national, in the case of the EU). Roadmaps were identified by searching online da-
tabases and through stakeholder interviews. The review focused on those addressing hydrogen directly, aiming to identify those
that have been used as part of a broader policy process that aims to address the transition to a hydrogen energy system. However,
hydrogen technologies are developed and managed within the context of a broader portfolio of innovative energy technologies,
and so the review identified the following types of relevant roadmaps:
– Hydrogen energy and fuel cell roadmaps
– Low carbon vehicle roadmaps (that include hydrogen)
– Low-carbon energy technology roadmaps (that include hydrogen)
Table 1
Summary table of criteria for transition roadmap evaluation.
Criteria Key questions
Credibility Is the roadmap based on sound analysis?
Does the roadmap draw on the right breadth of expertise?
Has the roadmap secured the participation and commitment of key actors in the innovation system?
Does the roadmap adequately address the political, social and economic aspects of the transition?
Desirability Does the transition meet social goals established through democratic institutions?
Does the roadmap give a clear account of the justification for the proposed pathway, with transparency in aims, process and who took part?
Is the roadmap process inclusive and participatory?
Utility Does the roadmap effectively articulate a path forwards that can enable alignment around common goals?
Is the roadmapping approach appropriate for the stage of innovation system maturity?
Adaptability Does the roadmapping process involve periodic reviews, updates and learning?
Is the roadmapping process embedded in a broader institutional structure that enables reflexivity and learning?
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The review included roadmaps from: the US, Australia, India, the UK, Japan, China, the EU, Iceland, Germany and Canada. In
some countries/jurisdictions, more than one roadmap was examined. In total, 15 roadmapping initiatives were included in the
review (see Table 2). Abbreviations, listed in Table 2, are used to ease the referencing and readability of the paper.
The reviewwas conducted using a standard template to extract a consistent set of information from each document. While the
review focused on the documents themselves, the review also examined further documentary evidence to inform the institutional
context behind the roadmaps (i.e. how were they produced, how are they being used).
6. Evaluation of hydrogen roadmaps: a socio-technical perspective
Governments have used roadmaps to inform and promote the development of hydrogen energy in a variety of ways. The style and
approach include roadmaps built on intensive, multi-year and analytically rich processes (e.g. HyWays), short overview roadmaps
built on the basis of a single workshop (UKH2), and ongoing roadmapping processes that are embedded within broader energy tech-
nology strategy (JPCE). This section applies the framework developed in Section 3 to the literature, to examine how governments are
using roadmaps for a transition to hydrogen energy.
6.1. Credibility
6.1.1. Are roadmaps informed by good quality analysis and broad expert participation?
The quality and depth of technical analysis underpinning roadmaps varies considerably. In many cases (e.g. USH2, UKFC, EUHLG,
IC, CN03, IN), analysis focuses on mapping the actors and institutions involved in hydrogen and fuel cells, and market opportunity
assessment. Rather fewer roadmaps explicitly include technological forecasting of future cost/performance or technology needs as-
sessment (e.g. HyWays, AUS). Analytic modes include both forecasting (identification, examination and projection of market and
technology trends) and backcasting (identification of steps that need to be taken in order to reach an established goal).
Some of the roadmaps are informed by detailed modelling exercises, sometimes involving multiple modelling approaches. The
German, HyWays, and Australian roadmaps included detailed modelling studies of hydrogen costs and competitiveness. Other
roadmaps were informed by relatively simplistic analysis, including simple extrapolation of historical sales figures many years
into the future (e.g. CAN03). Across the studies, analysis of technological goals and needs appears to be more robust than analysis
of future markets and opportunities. This is perhaps not surprising: the former is concerned with providing clear, informed direc-
tion to innovators; while the latter is subject to the inherent tension within roadmaps: providing confidence in the future of the
technology, without contributing to potentially damaging ‘hype’ cycles. In retrospect, the market analysis that contributed to
Table 2
Roadmaps included in the review.
Roadmapping initiative/document(s) Abbreviation Country/region
and year
Core sponsors; reference
Hydrogen technology roadmap AUS Australia 2008 Government of Australia [77]
Canadian fuel cell commercialization roadmap; Canadian fuel
cell commercialization roadmap update
CAN03,
CAN08
Canada 2003,
2008
Government of Canada [78], Hydrogen
and Fuel Cells Canada [79]
Hydrogen energy vision and technology roadmap report for China CN China 2004 Ministry of Science and Technology, China [80]
HyWays: the European hydrogen roadmap HyWays EU 2008 European Commission [81]
Hydrogen energy and fuel cells: a vision of our future EUHLG EU 2003 European Commission High Level Group on
Hydrogen and Fuel Cells [82]
European Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Platform:
deployment strategy, strategic research agenda and
implementation plan
EUHFTP EU 2005, 2006
and 2007
European Commission Hydrogen and Fuel Cell
Technology Platform [83–85]
The GermanHy roadmap DE Germany 2008 German federal government and the German
National Organisation for Hydrogen and Fuel Cell
Technology [86]
The Icelandic hydrogen energy roadmap IC Iceland 2008 Icelandic Ministry of Industry and Commerce [87]
National hydrogen energy roadmap: pathway for
transition to hydrogen energy in India
IN India 2007 Indian Ministry for New and Renewable Energy [88]
Strategic technology roadmap (energy sector) JPSTR Japan 2005 Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry [89]
Cool earth innovative energy technology program:
technology development roadmap
JPCE Japan 2008 Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry [90]
Fuel cell vision for the UK; and UK fuel cell development
and deployment roadmap
UKFC UK 2003, 2005 Fuel cells UK and Department for Trade and Industry
[91,92]
Roadmap for hydrogen energy in the UK UKH2 UK 2009 Technology Strategy Board, Department for Energy
and Climate Change, UK Hydrogen Association [93]
A national vision of America's transition to a hydrogen economy —
to 2030 and beyond; national hydrogen energy roadmap
USH2 US 2002 US Department of Energy [94,95]
Fuel cell technologies roadmap; hydrogen production roadmap;
hydrogen delivery roadmap; hydrogen manufacturing R&D roadmap
USFCAR US 2005, 2009,
2007, 2005
US FreedomCAR and Fuel Partnership [96–99]
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some of the earlier roadmaps reviewed (such as CAN03) can be seen as has having contributed to early hype about hydrogen. All
the roadmaps involved some form of participatory or consultative process through which to engage expert stakeholders.
6.1.2. Participation and commitment of key stakeholders
Roadmap credibility depends on the participation and commitment of key stakeholders whose actions are critical in the fur-
ther development of the system, such as major firms involved in automotive and fuel supply markets. All the roadmaps reviewed
attempted to secure the participation or commitment of stakeholders through consultations or participatory processes. In several
cases, participatory workshops were the main input into roadmap development (UKH2, CN, USH2).
Governments are central players in the development of a hydrogen energy system, since policy support is necessary to over-
come the barriers associated with an infrastructure transition [76]. While all the roadmaps were either produced or sponsored by
governments, there are obvious differences among roadmaps in the degree of commitment from government and from other
major stakeholders. Some are endorsed at the highest levels of government, and are associated with the participation and engage-
ment of major industries (e.g. USH2, USFCAR, JPSTR, JPCE, EUHLG, IN). Others are published or sponsored by governments, but
without obvious high-level political endorsement, such as a preface by a senior minister (e.g. UKH2, UKFC, CN, HyWays). Several
of the more technically-detailed roadmapping exercises were sponsored by government, and produced through formal collabo-
rative partnerships made up of industry, government and research organisations, with working groups addressing particular is-
sues (e.g. EUHFTP, USFCAR). These partnerships involve a degree of commitment from all participants to the process, and may be
seen as producing more credible views of future pathways.
6.1.3. Adequate engagement with social, political and economic aspects
Most of the roadmaps engage to some extent with broader social, political and economic aspects of a transition, in the form of
addressing future market needs, energy and transport demands, and the policy drivers that are informing the broader social con-
text for hydrogen energy. In some cases, future consumer requirements (such as acceptable vehicle range) or market conditions
(such as carbon constraints) are set out in specific details.
In all the roadmaps, the future is much like the present in terms of consumer behaviour, cultural practices and transportation pat-
terns. This is in strong contrast to many hydrogen futures developed by NGOs, academics and visionaries, many of which describe fu-
tures that associate the establishment of a hydrogen energy system with widespread shifts in social values or structures. Discursive
themes around ‘ecotopia’ or radical decentralization and democratization, present in many hydrogen futures [100,101], are entirely
absent from the roadmaps. As a body of visions of the future, the roadmaps are strikingly conservative in their representation of how
future people and societies will meet their needs. This can be viewed as a failure to engage with broader uncertainties around socio-
technical change, or simply as a tacit set of assumptions about the durability of social structures and practices.
However, many of the roadmaps do depart from current social norms in their depiction of the governance mechanisms that
might accompany the transition to a hydrogen energy system. Several of the roadmaps envisage a future in which a transition
is effected through corporatist collaborative governance models involving partnerships of major industries (principally automo-
tive and oil companies) with governments. This view envisages government–industry partnerships making major investment
decisions in infrastructure and manufacturing capacity in a co-ordinated way, enabling a hydrogen system to overcome the enor-
mous challenge of establishing an entirely new vehicle refuelling infrastructure solely because of the benefits of the new fuel to
society. In other words, while the roadmaps reviewed tend to be rather conservative in their views of social practices and con-
sumer behaviour, they envisage new governance models for purposive socio-technical transitions.
6.2. Desirability
Very few of the roadmaps incorporate a detailed analytic case for pursuing a hydrogen future (exceptions are HyWays and DE).
Rather,most build an argument based on the key public policy drivers (climate change, energy security, air pollution, and internation-
al competitiveness). Where there is detailed analysis of hydrogen energy systems, these are not comparedwith alternatives (such as
transport systems based on battery electric vehicles) on a like-for-like basis. The analytic work underpinning roadmaps, while often
sophisticated, can thus be seen as providing justification, rather than supporting decision-making and deliberation.
All of the roadmaps are based on some form of participatory or consultative process, involving a range of stakeholders. Road-
maps differ in the degree of transparency about who was involved, with many not making clear who participants were. None of
the roadmaps identified how participants were selected. Similarly, the roadmaps do not make clear how or whether consensus
was reached. Few of the roadmapping processes appear to have directly included broader voices from consumer or citizen per-
spectives, such as elected officials, participants from civil society groups or NGOs, or simply interested or concerned citizens. In
other words, the participatory processes through which roadmaps were developed were tightly framed and constrained in their
modes of participation and representation, and cannot be seen as providing a strong basis for social legitimacy to the hydrogen futures
envisaged.
6.3. Utility
All the roadmaps provide a broad, high-level vision. They frame hydrogen energy as a major area for future development, and
as a priority for R&D and investment activities. In this sense, roadmaps are all useful in endorsing the legitimacy of hydrogen tech-
nologies as a focus for innovative activity.
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Some roadmaps are limited to this broad, generic view. Examples of these roadmaps include CAN03, USH2, CN, IN, UKFC,
UKH2, and AUS. These roadmaps project a sense of vision and the pathway of development, but with limited technical detail
or specific targets. These ‘framing roadmaps’ are typically produced as an initial attempt to clarify the state of the emerging inno-
vation system and its prospects. They deploy a coherent ‘technology story’, deploying generic expectations (in the sense used by
van Lente and Bakker [44]) about the promise of the field in general, rather than expectations about specific technological details.
Their purpose can be understood as primarily political, doing the work of establishing and legitimating a frame through which to
understand and relate to hydrogen technologies. Many of these roadmaps lack substantial technical detail, and while they typically
provide an overview of the relevant technologies, they provide only limited guidance to innovators in terms of focusing on research
challenges. These roadmaps may describe the technologies in detail, but they are typically empty of the forward-looking technology
analysis that is usually seen as a defining characteristic of technology roadmapping activities. They are most appropriate for the for-
mative phases of an innovation system.
Other roadmaps combine this generic vision with specific technical detail. In these technically-detailed roadmaps, governments
work with academia and industry to establish R&D targets and detailed technological milestones against which progress can be
assessed. Examples of this mode of roadmapping include the USFCAR, HyWays, EUHFTP, JPSTR, and JPCE. Some of the roadmaps es-
tablish milestones and decision-points. For example, the US roadmapping processes highlight a decision point in 2015 on full-scale
commercialization of fuel cell vehicles.
Both of these modes (‘framing’ and ‘technically-detailed’) can be understood as providing a coherent direction of search, but
for different stages of innovation system maturity. For an emerging innovation system, in which alignment of actors is poor and
shared expectations are weak, it is necessary to first provide an overarching framing roadmap through which to facilitate the co-
alescing of the innovation system. Only once this broader framework has become accepted is it possible to provide more specific
direction.
6.4. Adaptability
Most of the roadmaps reviewed appear to be one-off exercises, rather than ongoingmanagement processes. This is particularly
true for the ‘framing’ roadmaps, which tend to set out a strategic view rather than a detailed structure for monitoring progress
(e.g. CN, IN, AUS, UKH2).
A minority of the hydrogen roadmapping processes reviewed have been subject to updates and reviews. The development of
sequential US roadmaps has been taken forward by the FreedomCAR and Fuel Partnership, a joint initiative of government, auto-
motive firms and energy companies. In Japan, the Ministry for Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has developed hydrogen
roadmaps as part of its broader process of Strategic Technology Roadmapping, which includes reviews of roadmaps every 2 to
3 years [102]. The Canadian hydrogen roadmap has been updated, and radically revised, by the industry body Hydrogen and Fuel
Cells Canada. The roadmaps developed by the European Commission have not explicitly been reviewed and updated, but they
have formed a sequence of related roadmapping initiatives, managed through an evolving institutional structure (first the High
Level Group on hydrogen and fuel cells, followed by the Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Platform, and now the Joint Undertaking
on Hydrogen and Fuel Cells).
7. Conclusions
This paper has described theway inwhich governments have increasingly been using the practices of technology roadmapping to
informand shape long-term systems innovations, or technological transitions. In reviewing hydrogen roadmaps, and evaluating them
from a socio-technical perspective, the following conclusions can be drawn:
• The theoretic literature on transition management and the role of expectations suggests that roadmaps can be a valuable com-
plement to transition management policy. Their use in such contexts reflects a rise in the use of ‘systemic instruments’ [103] in
innovation for sustainability, and this is to be welcomed. However, none of the roadmaps reviewed fully met all the criteria, and
there appears to be considerable scope for improvement in roadmapping practice for long-term transitions.
• The roadmaps reviewed vary in the quality of analysis on which they are based. Some draw on strong analysis, with well-
established methods and transparent assumptions. However, there are also many roadmaps that appear to be based on weak
analysis or that lack sufficient transparency to judge the robustness of the conclusions on which the roadmaps are based.
This is potentially damaging: poor quality and opaque analysis results in unrealistic expectations, and can exacerbate hype-
cycles, undermining the development of the innovation system.
• All of the roadmaps involved some form of consultative or participatory process involving key stakeholders. However, some of
the roadmapping initiatives appear to have been conducted without ensuring participation and buy-in from key players in the
innovation system, which limits the credibility – and therefore the utility – of the resulting futures. Those initiating roadmapping
processes should ensure that they have sufficient resources and credibility to attract key participants to commit to the process.
• Few of the roadmaps set out an adequately argued case for the desirability of hydrogen futures. Most roadmaps clearly identify
the drivers and motivations for developing a hydrogen energy system (climate change, energy security, air pollution and the
development of new industries), but few adequately demonstrate that hydrogen is a likely or preferable means to achieving
those ends.
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• Roadmapping processes are often insufficiently transparent and are often closed to broader participation. Technology road-
maps, when used to address systems innovations, are attempts to engineer a landscape of expectations that is conducive to
the development of a new socio-technical system. They can and should be a site of democratic engagement and debate about
the direction of socio-technical change. Broader consultation and public input is common practice in many other fields of policy
development and should be more common in roadmapping.
• Many roadmaps are conducted as one-off exercises. This is unfortunate, as roadmapping should enable a structure for learning
about a transition as it unfolds. Those developing roadmaps should, where possible, institutionalize the updating and ongoing
evaluation of roadmaps. In other words, roadmappers should allow roadmapping processes to operate in a reflexive, learning
mode, through an established institutional arrangement.
The work has highlighted the potential of transition roadmaps as one type of ‘systemic instrument’ in the governance of tran-
sitions. Two priorities for further research can be identified from this initial study.
1. The relationship of transition roadmaps to other foresight approaches. This paper has suggested a distinction between road-
maps, as ‘purposefully performative’ futures, and most other kinds of foresight activity. However, many of the issues raised
in the paper also apply to other foresight approaches when considered in the broader context of transition management. In
particular, there is a need for clearer insight into the way in which different foresight activities can be used to enable either
“opening up” or “closing down” of appraisal and commitments within the innovation system.
2. The institutional structure and design of transition roadmapping processes requires further development. This paper has
highlighted ways in which the tools of technology roadmapping can be used to inform and shape socio-technical transitions,
and it has provided a broad framework for the application of this approach. Further study on the dynamics of roadmapping
processes, and the impact of roadmaps on innovation system development, would be valuable in shaping recommendations
about the detailed design and structure of roadmapping processes as part of innovation and transition management policy.
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